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II Ill 1SDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2003).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the trial court correctly denied Defendant's Motion to Vacate

Default Judgment where Defendant failed to provide any reason whatsoever, much less
good cause, as to why Defendant failed to respond or answer Plaintiffs properly filed
and served complaint until after the default judgment had been entered (R. at 68, 75).
2.

Whether the trial court correctly denied Defendant's Motion to Vacate

Default Judgment where Defendant has not offered any proposed answer or shown that if
permitted to answer, Defendant would be able to raise a meritorious defense (R. at 68,
74).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion to Vacate Default Judgment
("Motion to Vacate") for failing to show that the default judgment was entered as a result
of any reason set forth in Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Classic Cabinets, Inc. v. All American Life Ins. Co., 1999 UT App
88, U 9.
The trial court's finding that Defendant failed to raise a meritorious defense is a
question of law reviewed for correctness. Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, % 12.
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STATEMENT O F T H E CASE
On April 24, 2005, Defendant, who is neither an infant nor legally incompetent, was
served with Plaintiffs Summons and Complaint in an effort to collect on more than $19,572.12
worth of credit card debt. R. at 1-6. In the Complaint, Plaintiff specifically alleged that Plaintiff
and Defendant entered into a written agreement consummated in Salt Lake County, Utah,
whereby Plaintiff agreed to issue an AT&T Universal Card ("AT&T Card") to Defendant, and
whereby Defendant agreed to repay Plaintiff for the charges Defendant made or authorized on
such credit card ("Credit Card Agreement"). R. at 1. Plaintiff thereafter issued the AT&T Card
to Defendant pursuant to the Credit Card Agreement. Id. The Defendant then used the AT&T
Card at various times and places to make credit card purchases against the AT&T Card account
issued to Defendant by Plaintiff. Id. Finally, the Complaint reflected that Defendant breached
the Credit Card Agreement by failing to repay Plaintiff for the charges Defendant made on the
AT&T Card, which as of March 9, 2005, amounted to $19,572.12. R. at 2. Consequently,
Plaintiff prayed for judgment in the amount of the outstanding debt of $19,572.12, plus interest
prior to and after judgment at the statutory rate, and for Plaintiffs costs of Court. Id.
Despite being personally served, Defendant ignored and failed to answer or provide any
response to the Complaint and on June 16, 2005, the Third District Court signed and entered a
default judgment against Defendant in the amount of $19,572.12, plus $197.00 in costs for a total
judgment of $19,769.12 (the "Default Judgment"). R. at 7-9. A Notice of Entry of Default
Judgment was sent to Defendant pursuant to Rule 58(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on
or about June 22, 2005. R. at 10,
On July 9, 2005, as part of the process to enforce the Judgment, Defendant was served
with a Motion for Order in Supplemental Proceedings and the related Signed Order in
Supplemental Proceedings, which required Defendant to appear in court on July 22, 2005. R. at
869912.1
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11-13. In response, on July 21, 2005, Defendant filed a Motion to Vacate the Default Judgment
("Motion to Vacate"). R. at 14-24. The Motion to Vacate was the first instance in which
Defendant made any effort to respond to Plaintiffs Complaint. R. at 1-13.
In a single sentence of the nine-plus-page Motion to Vacate, Defendant accuses
Plaintiffs counsel of misconduct. R. at 14 Then in a separate single sentence Defendant alleges
that he never received an opportunity to defend himself in this action. Id. However, Defendant's
Motion to Vacate does not explain what misconduct Plaintiffs counsel allegedly engaged in, nor
does Defendant explain why, after being personally served, Defendant did not respond to or
answer the Complaint. R. at 14-24. Defendant, in his Motion to Vacate, did not deny the
existence of the Credit Card Agreement, nor that he used the AT&T Card and charged
$19,572.12. Id Furthermore, there are no claims in the Motion to Vacate that Defendant paid
Plaintiff the $19,572.12 he owes pursuant to the Credit Card Agreement. Id Indeed, the Motion
to Vacate consists of incoherent citation to irrelevant case law from other state and federal
jurisdictions without analysis to connect such citations to the case at bar. R. at 14-24, The topics
of Defendant's wandering citation range from the litigation of promissory notes to the effect of
void judgments. IcL Finally, a review of the record shows that Defendant has never filed or
provided a proposed answer to Plaintiffs Complaint, whether with the Motion to Vacate or
otherwise, R. at 1-80.
On August 22, 2005, counsel for Citibank filed its response to the Motion to Vacate
("Response to Motion to Vacate"). R. at 35-53. Citibank filed a notice to submit on August 31,
2005, and on October 7, 2005, the Court issued a written ruling denying the Motion to Vacate.
R. at 53, 56-58. In response, on October 17, 2005, Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider,
which Plaintiff responded to on October 20, 2005.
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R. at 63-65.

Defendant's Motion to

Reconsider was also effectively denied when Judge Terry Christiansen issued a formal signed
order denying the Motion to Vacate on November 2, 2005. R. at 66-67,
Defendant's brief to this Court ("Appellant's Brief) is almost identical to Defendant's
Motion to Vacate, except that Defendant has added new issues that were not argued before the
trial court below. Appellant's Br. at 4-1 - 15-1. For example, for the first time in Appellant's
Brief, Defendant alleges that the Default Judgment issued by the trial court was based upon an
arbitration award from the National Arbitration Forum, and that Defendant never agreed to such
arbitration. Appellant's Br. at 6-1. Indeed, Defendant repeatedly laments the injustices of this
alleged arbitration throughout Appellant's Brief.

Appellant's Br. at 6-1, 8-1, 10-1 - 10-2.

However, Plaintiffs Complaint and claims therein were for the unpaid balance owed by
Defendant to Plaintiff for charges made on the AT&T Card, and did not reference or concern any
arbitration award.1 R. at 1-2, and 46-49.
In Appellant's Brief, it is also alleged for the first time that the Credit Card Agreement
was procured through fraudulent omissions "of the terms and condition under which a credit card
could be issued." Appellant's Br. at 4-1 - 4-2. However, Defendant fails to set forth what those
purported omissions were or any facts to support his conclusory allegation of fraud. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Defendant has brought this appeal in an attempt to overturn the trial court's denial of his
Motion to Vacate, to have the Default Judgment vacated, and to further avoid paying the

1

As further evidence of the incoherence and irrelevance of Defendant's arguments,
it would appear from the record that Defendant may have had an arbitration involving
Chase Manhattan Bank. If such arbitration did occur, Citibank was not party. R. at 25.
Furthermore, Chase Manhattan was never a party to the case at bar and none of
Citibank's claims against Defendant, which form the basis for the Default Judgment,
have been arbitrated. R. at 1 - 80. Accordingly, Defendant's reference to the alleged
arbitration that he had with Chase Manhattan Bank is of no relevance here.

869912.1
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$19,572.12 worth of credit card debt he owes Plaintiff. However, the Default Judgment was
properly entered against Defendant pursuant to Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and Defendant has failed to set forth any basis that relief should be granted pursuant to Rule
60(b).
ARGUMENT
I.

PURSUANT TO RULE 55 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY ENTERED AGAINST DEFENDANT
In Utah, the issuance of a default judgment is governed by Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 55. "Rule 55 provides for the entry of default by the clerk
of the court whenever a party has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by [the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure]." Skanchy v. Calcado Ortope SA., 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1996);
see also Utah R. Civ. P. 55(a)(1). "In other words, all that must be shown for the entry of a
default is that the defendant has failed to answer the complaint in a timely fashion." Id (citation
omitted).

Furthermore, in Utah "[a] clerk of the court may enter a default judgment if a

defendant defaults and if the complaint seeks damages for a 'sum certain or for a sum which can
by computation be made certain."' Id (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b)).
The record confirms that Defendant was personally served with Plaintiffs Summons and
Complaint on April 24, 2005. R. at 1-2. Pursuant to Plaintiffs Summons and Rule 4(f)(1) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant had twenty days from the date he was served to file an
answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiffs Complaint. R, at 3; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1).
Consequently, Defendant had until May 24, 2005, to answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiffs
Complaint. Defendant failed to do so. Accordingly, on June 16, 2005, a default was entered
against Defendant by the Clerk of the Third District Court. Because Plaintiffs Complaint sought

869912 1
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damages for a sum certain, the Clerk of the Court also separately issued the Default Judgment
against Defendant.
The Default Judgment was properly entered based on the unanswered Complaint. The
Complaint sets forth the Credit Card Agreement between Defendant and Plaintiff, whereby
Plaintiff issued Defendant the AT&T Card and Defendant agreed to repay Plaintiff for the
charges on the AT&T Card. Id The Complaint further alleged that Defendant had breached the
Credit Card Agreement by failing to repay Plaintiff for $19,572.12 worth of credit card charges
to the AT&T Card, and specifically requested judgment in that amount plus the costs of Court
and pre- and post-judgment interest. Id. Because Defendant failed to answer the Complaint,
those allegations are deemed true. See Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593, 596 (Utah App. 1992);
Murdock v. Blake, 484 P.2d 164, 169 (Utah 1971); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 8(d). Consequently,
to the extent that the Defendant belatedly attempts to impose a requirement that Citibank produce
underlying documents relating to the Account, Defendant waived such a right to discovery by
not answering the Complaint, as the factual allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint are considered
true as a result of Defendant's failure to answer. Id. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 55(b)(1), the
Clerk of the Third District Court properly entered the Default Judgment against Defendant for
the sum certain amount of $19,572.12 plus $197.00 in court costs for a total judgment of
$19,769.12.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
VACATE PURSUANT TO RULE 60(B) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
To obtain relief from the Default Judgment, Defendant had to first show that his failure to

answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiffs Complaint was due to excusable neglect or some other
basis for relief under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and second, that
Defendant had a meritorious defense to Plaintiffs claims. State ex rel. State Dep't of Soc. Servs.
869912.1
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v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055-56 (Utah 1983). Where, as here, a Defendant has failed to
show a Rule 60(b) basis for relief from a default judgment exists, it is inappropriate to even
consider the issue of meritorious defense. Id
A,

The Motion To Vacate Was Properly Denied by the Trial Court Because
Defendant Failed To Articulate Any Reason Why He Failed To Answer or
Otherwise Respond to Plaintiffs Complaint

According to Rule 55(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, once a default judgment
has been entered it may only be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b). Arnica Mut. Ins. Co, v.
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c). In order for
Defendant to be relieved from the Default Judgment, he must first show that the judgment was
entered against him through one of the reasons articulated in Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, which include mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, fraud,
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party. Holmes v. Holmes, 1999 UT App
194, If 1 (quoting Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah
1994)). Furthermore, to vacate the Default Judgment, the Defendant must clearly articulate
which of the Rule 60(b) bases he is relying upon for such relief. See Holmes, 1999 UT App 194

atU
Defendant, in his Motion to Vacate, however, never clearly articulates which of the
grounds set forth in Rule 60(b) forms the basis for his Motion to Vacate. Indeed, the closest
Defendant gets to articulating any Rule 60(b) basis for relief is by making the following two
unsupported conclusory allegations: (1) Defendant accuses Plaintiffs counsel of subterfuge and
criminal misconduct in obtaining the Default Judgment; and (2) Defendant claims that he did not
receive an opportunity to defend on a motion for default. R. at 14.
In order for purported attorney misconduct to provide a Rule 60(b) basis for vacating a
default judgment, such conduct must have given the non-answering party the impression that
869912.1
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their filing of an answer would not be necessary. See e.g. Cent. Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 656
P,2d 1009, 1012 (Utah 1982) (credit card holder/defendant who claimed to have been mislead by
the credit card company's counsel was not relieved from a default judgment because the credit
card holder had failed to show that the purported misconduct by counsel led the credit card
holder to believe that an answer was not required). In this case, however, there is no evidence of
any misconduct by Plaintiffs counsel, much less any misconduct that could have conceivably
led Defendant to believe that he did not need to file an answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiffs
Complaint. To the contrary, the only record of any communication between Defendant and
Plaintiff regarding Defendant's need to file an answer prior to the entry of the Default Judgment
was in Plaintiffs Summons. R at 1-10. Plaintiffs Summons expressly stated that Defendant
had twenty days to file an answer and if he failed to do so, a judgment by default would be taken
against him. R. at 3. Consequently, the conclusory and unsubstantiated one-line allegation of
attorney misconduct contained in the Motion to Vacate fails to provide a Rule 60(b) basis for
relieving Defendant from the Default Judgment.
Defendant's claim that he was not afforded an opportunity to defend himself in this case
is equally without merit. The record clearly shows that Defendant was personally served nearly
two months prior to the entry of the Default Judgment and that Defendant did nothing in that
time to answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiffs Complaint. R. at 1-13. In order for relief from
the Default Judgment to be appropriate, Defendant would have had to show that his failure to
answer or respond was at least due to excusable neglect. Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1055-56 (Utah
1983); see also Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State Ins. Dep't, 1999 UT App 330, H 10 (to
demonstrate that the default was due to excusable neglect rather than a mere lack of diligence,
"[t]he [Rule 60(b)] movant must show that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented
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from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control."); Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v.
Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 68, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973) (same). The Motion to Vacate and
Appellant's Brief, however, both fail to marshall any evidence in the record as to why Defendant
failed to respond or otherwise answer Plaintiffs Complaint.

Accordingly, the trial court

properly denied Defendant's Motion to Vacate because Defendant failed to clearly articulate or
set forth any Rule 60(b) basis for relief.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Denied The Motion To Vacate for the Additional
Reason That Defendant Failed To Show That He Had a Meritorious Defense

In addition to showing that the default judgment was entered as a result of one of the
reasons articulated in Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party seeking relief
from a default judgment "must also show that [his proposed answer contains] a meritorious
defense to the action." Holmes, 1999 UT App 194 at % 1 (quoting Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1148).
A meritorious defense is one of "at least sufficient ostensible merit as would justify a trial of the
issue thus raised." Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149, (citing State Bank v. Major Blakeney Corp., 545
P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1976).
However, because Defendant failed to show excusable neglect or any other basis for
relief under Rule 60(b), it is "unnecessary, and moreover inappropriate, to even consider the
issue of meritorious defenses." Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1056. Nonetheless, even if Defendant
had been able to show a Rule 60(b) basis for relief from the Default Judgment, Defendant has
failed to provide a proposed answer or otherwise set forth a meritorious defense to the claims in
Plaintiffs Complaint.
Indeed, the Motion to Vacate consists of citation to irrelevant case law from other state
and federal jurisdictions without any coherent analysis to connect such citations to Plaintiffs
claims against Defendant

869912.1

R. at 14-24. The topics of Defendant's wandering citation in the
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Motion to Vacate have nothing to do with the claims asserted by Plaintiff and range from the
litigation of promissory notes to the effects of void judgments, IcL
For example, in the Motion to Vacate, Defendant cites to New Jersey as well as Fifth and
Ninth Circuit jurisprudence regarding promissory note litigation. R. at 14-15. However, the
Complaint Plaintiff filed against Defendant sought damages relating to a $19,572,12 credit card
debt that Defendant failed to repay as agreed, and had nothing to do with a promissory note. R.
at 1-2. Consequently, Defendant's citation to the promissory note collection practices in New
Jersey and the Fifth and Ninth Circuits does not constitute a meritorious defense to Plaintiffs
claims.
Furthermore, to the extent that Defendant has attempted to argue that there was no
contract, such an argument fails under both the facts and the law. Nowhere does Defendant deny
that he received and used the AT&T Card to charge over $19,000. Nor does Defendant provide
any authority to support the notion that only an agreement executed by him was required to
obtain the Default Judgment. Indeed, under Utah law, a contract consists of offer, acceptance
,and consideration. Bench v. Bechtel Civil Minerals, Inc., 758 P.2d 460, 461 (Utah Ct. App.1988) (the elements of an enforceable contract are generally proper subject matter, offer and
acceptance, competent parties, and consideration); see also Aquagen IntT, Inc. v. Calrae Trust,
972 P.2d 411, 413-14 (Utah 1998).
Plaintiff offered Defendant the AT&T Card pursuant to the Credit Card Agreement and
Defendant accepted by promising to repay Plaintiff for charges he made or authorized and then
charging in excess of $19,000 on the card. Therefore, Defendant has not and cannot show that
there was no contract or that Plaintiff failed to perform under its terms. Indeed, Defendant is

869912.1
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simply attempting to avoid the plain and uncontroverted fact that he owes Plaintiff over $19,000
in charges made on the AT&T Card.
Finally, Defendant's citation to Oklahoma law regarding the effect of void judgments
does not explain or analyze how or why the Default Judgment could be considered void, such
citation does not constitute a meritorious defense to Plaintiffs claims. R. at 18. Indeed, a
default judgment "is void only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction [over] the subject
matter or the parties." Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, U 10
(citing Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah Ct App. 1991).
Furthermore, u[w]hen a judgment, including a default judgment, has been entered by a court of
general jurisdiction, the law presumes that jurisdiction exists, and the burden is on the party
attacking jurisdiction to prove its absence." Jackson Const. Co. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, ^j 9
(quoting State v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132-33 (Utah 1989).
In this case, the Court's ability to exercise personal jurisdiction attached when Defendant,
who is a resident of Utah, was personally served with Plaintiffs Summons and Complaint. See
Bawden & Assocs. v. Smith, 624 P.2d 676, 676-78 (Utah 1981); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 3. It is
undisputed that Defendant was personally served with Plaintiffs Summons and Complaint on
April 24, 2005. R. at 1-4. Consequently, because Defendant has failed to provide a meritorious
defense and has failed to set forth any evidence that would indicate that jurisdiction was absent,
there is no basis for treating the Default Judgment as void, and Defendant's citation to Oklahoma
law regarding the effects of void judgments is irrelevant and cannot constitute a meritorious
defense.

869912.1
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C.

Defendant's Newly Raised Issues Relating to an Alleged Arbitration and
Purported Fraud Should Not Be Considered by This Court in the First
Instance and Otherwise Fail To Indicate Defendant Has a Meritorious
Defense

The "scope of review [of a trial court's] refus[al] to set aside the default [judgment is
limited to] the grounds set forth in Defendant's motion below." Classic Cabinets, Inc. v. All Am.
Life Ins. Co., 1999 UT App 88, H 16 n. 5 (quoting Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 96 (Utah 1986);
State v. Sixteen Thousand Dollars U.S. Currency, 914 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
(defendant must first present alleged errors regarding a default judgment to the trial court, and in
failing to do so such purported errors should not be reviewed on appeal). Defendant, for the first
time in Appellant's Brief, raised certain issues regarding a purported fraud associated with
Plaintiffs credit card application, and an arbitration that is not mentioned in the Complaint or the
Motion to Vacate. Appellant's Br. at 4-1 - 4-2. Because these issues were not first raised in
Defendant's Motion to Vacate to the trial court below, they should not now be addressed by this
Court. IdL
Even if reviewed by this Court, Defendant's claims relating to a purported arbitration
award and fraud fail to provide Defendant with a meritorious defense. The record clearly shows
that Plaintiffs claim against Defendant was an effort to collect a $19,572.12 credit card debt that
Defendant owes Plaintiff, and that such claim has nothing to do with an arbitration or arbitration
award. Furthermore, Defendant's claim of a purported fraud associated with Plaintiffs credit
card application process fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in order to state a claim for
fraud, Defendant needed to recite "[tjhe relevant surrounding facts with sufficient particularity to
show what facts are claimed to constitute [the fraud] charges." Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App
339, f 22 (quoting Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) (citations
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omitted)). The elements that Defendant needed to allege to bring a fraud claim include: (1) that
a representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing material fact (3) which was false
and (4) which the representer either (a) knew to be false or (b) made recklessly, knowing that
there was insufficient knowledge upon which tabase such a representation, (5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it and (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to that
party's injury and damage. Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT App 14, f 16; Gold
Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066-67 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted).
However, " mere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of relevant
surrounding facts, are insufficient." Id. (citing Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, 2001 UT 25,1f 36) (citations omitted).
For the first time in Appellant's Brief, Defendant baldly asserts that Plaintiff failed to
provide full disclosure in the credit application process, which supposedly constituted fraud.
Appellant's Br. at 4-1. However, Defendant fails to state what disclosure was allegedly omitted
and how Defendant relied upon the alleged omission, or how Defendant was harmed by such
purported omission. Id. Consequently, Defendant's conclusory allegation that Plaintiffs credit
card application process constituted a fraud fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted and is not a meritorious defense to Plaintiffs claims.
CONCLUSION
In summary, Defendant has produced no law or facts that would lead to reversal of the
trial court. Instead, the record reflects that Defendant was personally served with the Complaint,
did not explain why he failed to answer and interposed no meritorious defense. Since it is
undisputed that Defendant charged over $19,000 on the AT&T Card and failed to pay for those
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charges, judgment was properly entered for Plaintiff. For these reasons this Court should affirm
the trial court's ruling Denying Defendant's Motion to Vacate the Default Judgment.
DATED this 6th day of July, 2006.

A. CHRISTIANSEN
DAMON J. GEORGELAS
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Citibank
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 6th day of July, 2006, I caused to be served by United States
mail, first-class postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee
to the following.

R. John Forte
4 Snow Forest Cove
Sandy, UT 84092
Pro se Defendant
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ADDENDA TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE

ADDENDUM 1

Summons and Complaint, which, as indicated by the Constable's Return
of Service, were served on Defendant on April 24, 2005

ADDENDUM 2

Default Judgment, entered June 16, 2006

ADDENDUM 3

Defendant's Motion to Vacate

ADDENDUM 4

October 7, 2005, Minute Entry Ruling denying Defendant's Motion to
Vacate

ADDENDUM 5

November 2, 2005, Signed Order denying Defendant's Motion to Vacate

ADDENDUM 6

Holmes v. Holmes, 1999 UT App 194
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) N.A.
aka AT&T UNIVERSAL CARD
Plaintiff,
vs.
R J FORTE,
Defendant(s).

(^ijWfi^fr~^
^CX~>•

:

COMPLAINT
:

Civil No: 0^£>I09^^\

JX-^

For cause of action against Defendant(s), Plaintiff alleges as follows:
1. That Defendant(s) is a resident of SALT LAKE County, State of Utah, was a
resident of said county when the below-described was entered, promised performance in
said county, entered the below-described transaction in said county, and/or the abovementioned court has state-wide jurisdiction.
2. That Plaintiff and Defendant(s) did previously enter into a written agreement
whereby Plaintiff did agree to issue credit card(s) to Defendants) and whereby
Defendant(s) did agree to repay Plaintiff for Plaintiffs payment of charges and debts
incurred by Defendant(s) by the use of said credit card(s).
3. That thereafter Plaintiff did issue to Defendant(s) one or more credit cards,
pursuant to the terms of the above-mentioned agreement.
4. That, thereafter, at various business establishments and at various times and
places, Defendant(s) did make credit card purchases and charges against the credit card(s)
issued by Plaintiff and that Plaintiff has paid all said business establishments for
Defendant(s).

5. That Defendant(s) has breached the agree^efifregardicig repayment to Plaintiff,
has failed to repay Plaintiff, and owes Plaintiff the sum of $ 19,572.12]as of 3-9-05.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Do?endant(s) as follows:
(a) For the sum of $19,572.12 plus interest prior to and after the judgment thereon
at the statutory rate of interest.
(b) For Plaintiffs costs of Court.
(c) For such other and further relief as to the Court deems proper.

pA

/9/>*s (

DATED this2& day of FEBRUARY, 2005.
MIKEL M. BOLEY (0375)
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 75084
West Valley City, Utah 84170-0584
968-3501 Fax 968-8282
Plaintiffs Address:
7930 NW 110™ ST
KANSAS CITY, MO 64153

MikelM. Boley (0375)
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. BOX 70584
West Valley City, Utah 84170-0584
968-3501 Fax 968-8282
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CONSTABLE Rote SALT LAKE COUNTY UTAH
DEPUTY
Jn?Ta4A4^*± '
(/
/
2.255-5468

i VALLEY DEPARTHEH;

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL BISHaCT-^URIOF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, WEST VALLEY 'DEPARTMENT
CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) N.A.
, aka AT&T UNIVERSAL CARD
Plaintiff,
vs.
R J FORTE,
*
"
Defendant.

:
:

SUMMONS
(Ten-Day)
Civil No:

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT:
You need not answer the attached complaint, unless said complaint filed with the court
within 10 days of the date you were served. The phone number of the clerk of the court is 801-9822400. You can call that number after 13 days to see if the complaint has been filed.
If the complaint has been filed, you are hereby summoned and required to file with the
clerk of the above-entitled court at 3636 CONSTITUTION BLVD WEST VALLEY, UT 84120, an
answer in writing to the Complaint in the above-entitled case, a copy of which is attached
herewith, and to serve upon or mail to Mikel M. BOLEY, Plaintiffs attorney at the address shown
above, a copy of said answer within twenty (20) days after service of this summons upon you.
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded in
said complaint.

FCDRUi
DATE this 2D
JU day FCDRUARY,
2005.
Mikel M. Boley, AttorneyTor Plaintiff
SERVE DEFENDANT(S) AT:

CONSTABLE'S RETURN

Docket #378246

Ose/Judge:
:
ORTE

!, STEVEN J. MARQUISS
being first duly sworn on oath and say: I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable, SALT LAKE County, State of UT, a citizen of the
United States over the age of 21 years at the time of service herein, and not a part of or interested in the within action.
I received the within and hereto annexed,
SUMMONS & COMPLAINT

on April 20, 2005

, and served the same upon

R J FORTE
a within named Defendant in said article(s) by serving a true copy of said article(s) for the defendant with
KIMBERLY FORTE (WIFE)
a person of suitable age and discretion there residing at
40 LONE HOLLOW, SANDY
his/her usual place of ABODE,
on April 24,2005
I further certify that at the time of service of the said article(s), I endorsed the date and place of service and added my name and
official title thereto.
on April 24,2005

ilWMAUk**
Deputy

SL855

ROBERT J. REITZ, CONSTABLE, SALT LAKE County
7026 SOUTH COMMERCE PARK DR. SUITE 1-8, MIDVALE, UT 84047, 801-255-5468

NOTES

MILEAGE CHARGE:
SERVICE CHARGES:

30.00
12.00

TOTAL CHARGES:

$42.00
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MIKELM. B0LEY(0375)
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 70584
West Valley City, Utah 84170-0584
968-3501 Fax 968-8282
968-3502
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) N.A.
aka AT&T UNIVERSAL CARD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
R J FORTE
Defendant(s).

:

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

:

Civil No. 050102534DC
JUDGE: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN

DEFAULT JUDGMENT
The Defendant(s) R J FORTE has/have failed to plead or otherwise defend in this action
and default has been entered.
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) N.A. aka AT&T UNIVERSAL
CARD be awarded judgment against said Defendant(s) in the amount of:
Principal:
Interest:
Accrued costs:
Attorney's fees:
TOTAL JUDGMENT:

$19,572.12
$0
$197.00
$0
$19,769.12

with interest on the total judgment at the rate of 4.77% per annum as provided by law from MAY
16, 2005, which is the date this judgment was submitted to the Court, until paid, plus afteraccruing costs. And it is further

R J FORTE
40 LONE HOLLOW
SANDY, UT

ORDERED that this judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and
attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be
established by affidavit
DATED this

day of
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R. J. Forte
40 Lone Hollow
Sandy, Utah 84092
(801)565-1121
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT'
"' ''
CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) N. A.,
AKA: AT&T UNIVERSAL CARD

MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
vs.
JUDICIAL NOTICE
R. J. FORTE,
Civil No. 050102534DC
Defendant
Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Brief in support of motion to vacate
R. J. Forte, an aggrieved party, moves this court under authority of Utah Statute 78-33-6
for vacation of a default judgment attached. MIKEL M. BOLEY, ESQ. (0375) practicing
subterfuge and acting in a purely criminal mode, obtained judgment in this instant case. R. J.
Forte did not receive the opportunity to defend on a motion for either default or summary
judgment. Even if MTKEL M. BOLEY, ESQ. (0375) had properly noticed R. J. Forte, the record
does not reveal that CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) N.A-, AKA: AT&T UNIVERSAL CARD
proved standing to bring this action and MIKEL M. BOLEY, ESQ. (0375) failed to prove up the
claim of damages.
78-33-6. Discretion to deny declaratory relief.
The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where
such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the
uncertainty or controversy givingriseto the proceeding.
No Change Since 1953
Memorandum of law in support of the point of law that
party alleging to be creditor must prove standing
MIKEL M. BOLEY (0375) failed or refused to produce the actual notes which
CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) N.A., AKA: AT&T UNIVERSAL CARD alleges R. J. Forte

owes. Where the complaining party can not prove the existence 01 the note, then there is no
note. To recover on a promissory note, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of the note in
question; (2) that the party sued signed the note; (3) that the plaintiff is the owner or holder of the
note; and (4) that a certain balance is due and owing on the note. See In Re: SMS Financial LLc
v. Abco Homes, Inc. No.98-50117 February 18, 1999 (5th Circuit Court of Appeals.) Volume 29
of the New Jersey Practice Series, Chapter 10 Section 123, page 566, emphatically states, "...;
and no part payments should be made on the bond or note unless the person to whom payment is
made is able to produce the bond or note and the part payments are endorsed thereon. It would
seem that the mortgagor would normally have a Common law right to demand production or
surrender of the bond or note and mortgage, as the case may be. See Restatement, Contracts S
170(3), (4) (1932); C I S . Mortgages S 469 in Carnegie Bank v Shalleck 256 N J . Super 23
(App. Div 1992), the Appellate Division held, "When the underlying mortgage is evidenced by
an instrument meeting the criteria for negotiability set forth in N . I S . 12A:3-104, the holder of
the instalment shall be afforded all the rights and protections provided a holder in due course
pursuant to N.IS. 12A:3-302" Since no one is able to produce the "instrument" there is no
competent evidence before the Court that any party is the holder of the alleged note or the true
holder in due course. New Jersey common law dictates that the plaintiff prove the existence of
the alleged note in question, prove that the party sued signed the alleged note, prove that the
plaintiff is the owner and holder of the alleged note, and prove that certain balance is due and
owing on any alleged note. Federal Circuit Courts have ruled that the only way to prove the
perfection of any security is by actual possession of the security. See Matter of Staff Mortg. &
Inv. Corp., 550 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir 1977), "Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the only
notice sufficient to inform all interested parties that a security interest in instruments has been
perfected is actual possession by the secured party, his agent or bailee." Bankruptcy Courts have
followed the Uniform Commercial Code. In Re Investors & Lenders, Ltd

165 B.R. 389

(Bkrtcy.D.N.I1994), "Under the New Jersey Uniform Commercial Code (NJUCC), promissory
note is "instrument," security interest in which must be perfected by possession..."

Memorandum of law in support of the point of law that
even in a default judgment, damages must be proved

Trial court could not award damages to plaintiff, following default judgment, without
requiring evidence of damages. Razorsoft Inc. v. Maktai Inc., Okla. App. Div, L 907 P.2d 1102
(1995), rehearing denied. A party is not in default so long as he has a pleading on file which
makes an issue in the case that requires proof on the part of the opposite party in order to entitle

him to recover. Millikan v. aooth, Okla., 4 Okla. 713, 46 P. 489 (1896). Proof of or assessment
of damages upon petition claiming damages, it is error to pronounce judgment without hearing
proof or assessing damages. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Lambert, 31 Okla. 300, 121 P. 654.
Ann.Cas.l913E, 329 (1912); City of Guthrie v. T. W. Harvey Lumber Co., 5 Okla. 774, 50 P. 84
(1897). In the assessment of damages following entry of default judgment, a defaulting party has
a statutory right to a hearing on the extent of unliquidated damage, and encompassed within this
right is the opportunity to a fair post-default inquest at which both the plaintiff and the defendant
can participate in the proceedings by cross-examining witnesses and introducing evidence on
their own behalf Pavne v. Dewitt Okla., 995 P.2d 1088 (1999) A default declaration, imposed
as a discovery sanction against a defendant, cannot extend beyond saddling defendant with
liability for the harm occasioned and for imposition of punitive damages, and the trial court must
leave to a meaningful inquiry the quantum of actual and punitive damages, without stripping
defendant of basic forensic devices to test the truth of plaintiffs evidence, Pavne v. Dewitt,
Okla.. 995 P.2d 1088 (1999) Fracture of two toes required expert medical testimony as to
whether such injury was permanent so as to allow damages for permanent injury, future pain,
and future medical treatment on default judgment, and such testimony was not within
competency of plaintiff who had no medical expertise. Reed v. Scott, Okla., 820 P.2d 445, 20
A.L.RJth 913 (1991) Rendition of default judgment requires production of proof as to amount
of unliquidated damages. Reed v. Scott, Okla., 820 P.2d 445, 20 AX.R5th 913 (1991) When
face of judgment roll shows judgment on pleadings without evidence as to amount of
unliquidated damages then judgment is void. Reed v. Scott Okla., 820 P.2d 445, 20 AX.R.5th
913 (1991) In a tort action founded on an unliquidated claim for damages, a defaulting party is
deemed to have admitted only plaintiffs right to recover, so that the court is without authority or
power to enter a judgment fixing the amount of recovery in the absence of the introduction of
evidence. Graves v. Walters, Okla. App., 534 P.2d 702 (1975) Presumptions which ordinarily
shield judgments from collateral attacks were not applicable on motion to vacate a small claim
default judgment on ground that court assessed damages on an unliquidated tort claim without
first hearing any supporting evidence. Graves v. Walters, Okla. App., 534 P.2d 702 (1975) Rule
that default judgment fixing the amount of recovery in absence of introduction of supporting
evidence is void and not merely erroneous or voidable obtains with regard to exemplary as well
as compensatory damages. Graves v. Walters, Okla. App., 534 P.2d 702 (1975) Where liability
of father for support of minor daughter and extent of such liability and amount of attorney's fees
to be allowed was dependent on facts, rendering of final judgment by trial court requiring father
to pay $25 monthly for support of minor until minor should reach age 18 and $100 attorney's
fees without having heard proof thereof in support of allegations in petition was error. Ross v.
i

Ross. Okla.. 201 Okla. 174. 203 P.2d 702 (1949) Refusal to render default judgment against
codefendant for want of answer was not error, since defendants and court treated answer of
defendant on file as having been filed on behalf of both defendants, and since plaintiff could not
recover without offering proof of damages and offered no such proof Thomas v. Sweet. Okla..
173 Okla. 601. 49 P.2d 557 (1935) Under R.L.1910, §§ 4779, 5130 (see, now, this section and §
2007 of this title), allegation of value, or amount of damages stated in petition, were not
considered true by failure to controvert. Cudd v. Farmers1 Exch. Bank of Lindsay. Okla.. 76
Okla. 317. 185 P. 521 (1919) Hearing Trial court's discovery sanction barring defendant from
using cross-examination and other truth-testing devices at post-default non-jury hearing on
plaintiffs damages violated due process. Pavne v. Dewitt Okla.. 995 P.2d 1088 (1999)

Memorandum of law in support of the point of law that to prove
damages in foreclosure of a debt, party must enter the account and general ledger
statement into the record through a competent fact witness

To prove up claim of damages, foreclosing party must enter evidence incorporating
records such as a general ledger and accounting of an alleged unpaid promissory note, the person
responsible for preparing and maintaining the account general ledger must provide a complete
accounting which must be sworn to and dated by the person who maintained the ledger. See
Pacific Concrete ECU

V. Kauanoe, 62 Haw. 334, 614 P.2d 936 (1980), GE Capital Hawaii,

Inc. v. Yonenaka 25 P.3d 807, 96 Hawaii 32, (Hawaii App 2001), Fooks v, Norwich Housing
Authority 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 371, (Conn. Super.2000), and Town of Brookfield v. Candlewood
Shores Estates, Inc. 513 A.2d 1218, 201 Conn.l (1986). See also Solon v. Godbole, 163 111. App.
3d 845,114 D.

Memorandum of law in support of the point of law that a void judgment cannot operate

The general rule is that a void judgment is no judgment at all. Where judgments are void,
as was the judgment originally rendered by the trial court here, any subsequent proceedings
based upon the void judgment are themselves void. In essence, no judgment existed from which
the trial court could adopt either findings of fact or conclusions of law. Valley Vista Development
Corp. v. City of Broken Arrow, 766 P.2d 344, 1988 OK 140 (Okla. 12/06/1988); A void
judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested; from it no rights can
be obtained. Being worthless, in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are necessarily equally
worthless, and have no effect whatever upon the parties or matters in question. A void judgment

neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it, and all claims flowing out of it, are
absolutely void. The parties attempting to enforce it are trespassers." High v. Southwestern
Insurance Company, 520 P.2d 662, 1974 OK 35 (Okla. 03/19/1974); and, A void judgment
cannot constitute res judicata. Denial of previous motions to vacate a void judgment could not
validate the judgment or constitute res judicata, for the reason that the lack of judicial power
inheres in every stage of the proceedings in which the judgment was rendered. Bruce v. Miller,
360 P.2d 508, 1960 OK 266 (Okla. 12/27/1960).

Memorandum of law in support of the point of law that
a void judgment is not void when declared void but is void ab initio

If the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction of defendants case, his
conviction and sentence would be void ab initio. See Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68,
518N.E.2d941.

Memorandum of law in support of the point of law that party seeking to vacate a void
judgment is invoking the ministerial powers of the court / courts lack discretion when it
comes to vacating void judgments

When rule providing for relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is not
discretionary matter, but is mandatory, Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, (Colo. 1994). See also,
Thomas, 906 S.W.2d at 262 (holding that trial court has not only power but duty to vacate a void
judgment).

Judicial notice
This court is noticed: As soon as practical and reasonable, Love, Beal, and Nixon, the
private business organizations to which they belong, and all who aid and abet Love, Beal, and
Nixon shall be sued under authority of 18 USC 1964(a). See OS. Title 21, Chapter 19, § 554,
"Attorney Buying Evidence of Debt-Misleading Court. Every attorney who either directly or
indirectly buys or is interested in buying any evidence of debt or thing in action with intent to
bring suit thereon is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any attorney who in any proceeding before any
court of a justice of the peace or police judge or other inferior court in which he appears as
attorney, willfully misstates any proposition or seeks to mislead the court in any matter of law is
guilty of a misdemeanor and on any trial therefore the state shall only be held to prove to the
court that the cause was pending, that the defendant .appeared as^an^aitomey in the action, and
IS?

showing what the legal statement was, wherein it is not the law. If the defense be that the act was
not willful the burden shall be on the defendant to prove that he did not know that there was error
in his statement of law." Any person guilty of falsely preparing any book, paper, [({ record, })],
instrument in writing, or other matter or thing, with intent to produce it, or allow it to be
produced as genuine upon any [({ trial, proceeding or inquiry whatever, })] authorized by law,
SHALL BE GUILTY OF A FELONY. See Oklahoma Statutes Title 21. Crimes and
Punishments, Chapter 13, Section 453.
Memorandum of law in support of judicial notice
The federal district courts have jurisdiction under Civil Rico to order any person to divest
himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on
the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any
person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of
which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any
enterprise. Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit. Because the language of
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act authorizing suit by any person injured in
his business or property by reason of violation of Act tracks section 4 of the Clayton Act, rules
established in antitrust cases for identifying proper complaints should be applied to RICO, too.
Both requirements of Rule mandating particularity in pleading of fraud and liberal notice
pleading philosophy of federal rules apply to RICO claims based upon fraud. Congress intended
RICO. In order to state claim for treble damages as result of injury to business or property,
plaintiff in RICO action must (1) prove RICO violation, (2) prove injury to business or property,
and (3) that the violation caused the injury. Additionally, plaintiff must prove (1) existence of
enterprise which affects interstate commerce, (2) that defendant was employed by or associated
with the enterprise, (3) that defendant participated in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs, and
(4) that the participation was through a pattern of racketeering activity. Elements essential to CR
are (1) existence of RICO enterprise, (2) existence of pattern of racketeering activity, (3) nexus
between defendant, pattern of RICO activity or RICO enterprise, and (4) resulting injury to
plaintiff in his business or property. Plaintiff must demonstrate that he sustained injury as
proximate result of one or more predicate acts constituting pattern. Plaintiff must allege that
defendant, through commission of two or more acts, constituting pattern of racketeering activity,
directly or indirectly invested in, or maintained an interest in, or participated in an enterprise
affecting interstate commerce. Plaintiff must allege injury flowing from commission of predicate
acts which means that recovery must show some injury flowing from one or more predicate acts.

Plaintiff must show how violation caused injury and in conjunction with RICO prohibitions
stated in 18 USC 1962 (which centers on actions conducted through pattern of RICO activity by
reason of requirement effectively forces civil RICO plaintiff to demonstrate that predicate act
alleged for purposes of making out violation of 1962 resulted in direct harm). Causal connection
between injury and alleged acts of RICO activity is requirement of standing under RICO. Injury
must be caused by a pattern of RICO activity or by individual RICO predicate acts. Pattern or
acts must proximately cause the injury. There must be a direct relationship between plaintiffs
injury and plaintiffs conduct (as in plaintiff relying on). The test for proximate cause is
reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as natural consequence. Civil Rico cause of action does not
require prior criminal conviction, relationship to organized crime, or proof of injuries outside
those caused by the predicate acts. To prove that enterprise existed within meaning of RICO
plaintiffs must present evidence of ongoing organization and evidence that various associates
functioned as continuing unit. RICO plaintiff must establish that defendant has received money
from pattern of RICO activity and has invested that money in enterprise affecting interstate
commerce. Showing injury requires proof of concrete financial loss. Loss cannot be intangible.
Lost profit is an injury cognizable within Civil Rico. No particular RICO injury need be proven
to maintain a Civil Rico. Plaintiffs must prove criminal conduct in violation of RICO injured
business or property. Liability attaches where injury is direct or indirect result; however,
standing requires direct injury. Lost opportunity must be concrete injury meaning not
speculative. Civil Rico does not apply to personal injuries. Plaintiff need only establish that
predicate acts were proximate cause of injury. Plaintiffs are not required to show nexus between
defendants and organized crime. Plaintiffs must show (1) at least two predicate acts, (2) that
predicates were related, and (3) that defendants pose a threat of continued criminal activity.
Cardinal question is whether defendants have committed one of enumerated acts under 18 USC
1961. Relying on a fraud to one^s detriment and resulting injury to property or business is
injury cognizable within Civil Rico. Communicating misrepresentations to the effect that
the party relying on the misrepresentations loses money or property is injury. Injury
caused by reliance on fraud is injury. Standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence.
Question of whether plaintiffs business or property was injured is question of law for the court
taking into consideration such factors as foreseeability of particular injury, intervention of
independent causes and factual directness of causal connection. There are elements that must be
pled before plaintiff may avail himself of enhanced damages, (1) two predicate acts, (2) which
constitute a pattern of racketeering activity, (3) directly participating in the conduct of an
enterprise of (4) activities that affect interstate commerce, and (5) that plaintiff was injured in
business or property. There is no righLof contribution under civil liability provision of RICO

Act. Each element of RICO violation and its predicate acts must be alleged with particularity.
To state a claim under CR there must be a person, enterprise, and pattern of racketeering activity.
Plaintiffs must show a nexus between control of enterprise, RICO activity, and injury. Complaint
must allege (1) existence of enterprise affecting interstate commerce, (2) that defendant
participated directly or indirectly in the conduct or affairs of the enterprise, and (3) defendant
participated through a pattern of racketeering activity that must include the allegation of at least
two racketeering acts. A necessary ingredient of every successful Civil Rico claim is an element
of criminal activity. Civil Rico claim must adequately allege that scheme of fraud would have
foreseeable result and continuity or threat of continuing racketeering acts. Enterprise as defined
in Civil Rico is (1) identified formally or informally, and (2) common purpose of making
money from fraud schemes. Referring to entity as both enterprises and person does not defeat
Civil Rico in spite of requirement of (1) identifying a persons and a (2) separate enterprise.
Enterprise can be association-in-fact. Plaintiff must show how person's criminal conduct enables
obtaining an interest or control of the enterprise. Failing to allege that defendant was affiliated
with or engaged in organized crime is not fatal to Civil Rico claim. Sufficiency of pleading of
RICO conspiracy claim is not subject to higher pleading standard of civil rule for fraud claims.
In order to sufficiently allege a conspiracy, a party must allege two acts of racketeering with
enough specificity to show there is probable cause to believe that crimes were committed.
Although rule that fraud must be pled with particularity requires that plaintiff in a suit brought
under RICO provide only a general outline of the alleged fraud scheme, sufficient to reasonably
notify the defendants of their purported role in the scheme, the complaint must, at minimum, (1)
describe the predicate acts with some specificity and (2) state the time, (3) place, (4) content of
the alleged communications perpetrating the fraud and (5) identity of party perpetrating a fraud.
Fraud allegations are sufficient for purpose of stating Civil Rico claim if the place the defendant
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Affidavit
I, R. J. Forte, of lawful age and competent to testify state as follows based on my own
personal knowledge:
1. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that CITIBANK (SOUTH
DAKOTA) N.A, AKA: AT&T UNIVERSAL CARD has standing to sue in Oklahoma courts.
2. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that I have a contract with
CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) N.A, AKA: AT&T UNIVERSAL CARD
3. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that I owe CITIBANK (SOUTH
DAKOTA) N.A, AKA: AT&T UNIVERSAL CARD money.
4. I am not in receipt of any document which verifies that CITIBANK (SOUTH
DAKOTA) N.A, AKA: AT&T UNIVERSAL CARD authorized suit against me or is even
aware of it.

5. I am not in receipt of a motion for judgment by default or motion for summary
judgment on behalf of CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) N.A., AKA: AT&T UNIVERSAL
CARD.
6. As the result of MIKEL M. BOLEY, ESQ. (0375) pattenpofa^ against me, I have
been damaged financially, socially, and emotionally.

R. J. Forte
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
Before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said County and State on this
?h 1 day of J v t^
, 2005 , personally appeared R_ J. Forte to me known to be
the identical person who executed the within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me
that he executed the same as his free and voluntary act.
Given under my hand and seal the day and year last above written.

^^it-^Hh
My commission expires

Notary Public

\+MJk^ M * l | > l i

I'rllOo
\

My Coram, tnpkm Apf 29,2006
161S Campus View Of West Jordan J/T 840641
<m » t t » < » t i i

Declaration
Fifteen daysfromthe verifiable receipt of this motion to vacate a void judgment, an order
shall be prepared and submitted io the court for ratification unless prior to that time, MIKEL M
BOLEY, ESQ- (0375) rebut all articles - one through five - of my affidavit by and through a
competent fact witness making their statement under penalty of perjury, supporting all the
rebutted articles with evidence which would be admissible at trial, and sets the matter for
hearing.

Certificate of service
I, R. J. Forte, certify that July 2, \, 2005,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing motion to vacate via certified mail, return receipt requested to:
MIKEL ML BOLEY, ESQ. (0375)
Attorney for the Plaintiff
P.O. Box 70584
West Valley City, Utah 84170-0584

R. J. Forte
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3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CITIBANK,
Plaintiff,
vs.

COURT RULING
Case No: 050102534

R J FORTE,
Defendant

Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
Date: 10/07/2005

Clerk: susanh
Defendant's motion to vacate default judgment is denied by the
Court. Plaintiff's attorney to prepare order based on defendant's
failure to offer good cause for failure to answer complaint and
failure to raise meritorious defense.

Page 1 (last)

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry
was mailed to the following on October 7, 2005.
Mikel M. Boley
PO Box 70584
West Valley City Ut 84170-0584
k J Forte
40 Lone Hollow
Sandy, Ut 84092

Deputy Court Clerk

Q
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FILED
THIRD DISTRICT COURT

NOV - 2 2005
W K T J

MIKEL M. BOLEY (0375)

°RDAW

DEPT

Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 70584
West Valley City, Utah 84170-0584
968-3501 Fax 968-8282
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT
CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) N.A.
AKA AT&T UNIVERSAL CARD
Plaintiff,
: ORDER IN RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
VS.
R.J. FORTE
Defendant(s).

: Civil No: 050102534DC
Judge: CHRISTIANSEN

Defendant having filed a motion to vacate judgment, Plaintiff having filed a
response thereto, Plaintiff having filed a notice to submit and the Court having entered a
written ruling it is hereby
ORDERED, that Defendant's motion to vacate default judgment be and is hereby
denied.
DATED this 5 / day of

, 2005.

BY THE 0

/-#

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER IN RE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, this
14TH day of OCTOBER, 2005, addressed as follows:

R.J. FORTE
40 LONE HOLLOW
SANDY UT 84092

MIKELM.BDtEY
Attorney for Plaintiff

A.-1
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Not Reported in P.3d
Not Reported in P.3d, 1999 WL 33244641 (Utah App.), 1999 UT App 194
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d)
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT
RULES BEFORE CITING.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Heather S. HOLMES, Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
Robert L. HOLMES, Jr., Respondent and
Appellant.
No. 981382-CA.
June 17, 1999.
D. Bruce Oliver, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Sharon L. Preston, Salt Lake City, for appellee.
Before GREENWOOD, BILLINGS, and ORME,
JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
BILLINGS.
*1 Robert L. Holmes, Jr. (Appellant) appeals the
trial court's denial of his motion to vacate a default
judgment under Rule 60(b).
In order for defendant to be relieved from the
default judgment, he must not only show that the
judgment was entered against him through [one of
the reasons articulated in Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure], but he must also show that his
motion to set aside the judgment was timely, and
that [his proposed answer contains] a meritorious
defense to the action,
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Appellant fails to articulate why the custody and
visitation order he now attacks are not in the child's
best interest- His allegations of change of
circumstances should be brought as a petition to
modify the decree, not as a Rule 60(b) Motion.
In sum, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Appellant's Motion to set
aside default judgment. See Utah Dept. of Transp.
v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 1995) (quoting
Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986))
(citations omitted). Additionally, as prevailing party
on appeal, Appellee seeks attorney fees pursuant to
section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-56 (1996). We decline to award
attorney fees on appeal, as we conclude that
Appellant's action was not without merit and was
asserted in good faith. Affirmed.
GREENWOOD, A.P.J., and ORME, J., concur.
Utah App., 1999.
Holmes v. Holmes
Not Reported in P.3d, 1999 WL 33244641 (Utah
App.), 1999 UT App 194
END OF DOCUMENT

Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882
P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
In reviewing the record, we conclude that Appellant
has failed to meet either part of the Erickson
standard. He never clearly articulates which of the
grounds set forth in Rule 60(b) he alleges as the
basis for his Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment.
He makes much of the fact that he filed an answer
on the same day as the default judgment was entered
based upon his earlier signed consent to the entry of
a default judgment. However, he makes no legal
argument as to why this should change the result
under Rule 60(b). Further, he seems to concede that
his default was properly entered.
Moreover, Appellant's proposed answer fails the
second part of the Erickson standard as well.
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